An expression for the welfare cost of a marginal increase in the public debt is derived using a simple AK endogenous growth model. This measure of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) can be interpreted as the marginal benefit-cost ratio that a debt-financed public project needs in order to generate a net social gain. The model predicts an increase in the public debt ratio will have little effect on the optimal public expenditure ratio and that most of the adjustment will occur on the tax side of the budget.
Introduction
The marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is usually defined as the social cost of a tax rate increase that raises an additional dollar of tax revenue. Most models of the MCF have focused on measuring the social cost of raising revenues caused by labour market distortions. See, for example, Wildasin (1984) , Browning (1987) , Snow and Warren (1996) , and Dahlby (1998) . A few studies have measured the MCF for taxes that distort savings and investment decisions. See, for example, Fullerton and Henderson (1989) . While the MCF has usually been defined for a tax rate increase, it can also be defined for other measures that allow governments to finance additional public expenditures. For example, Fortin and Lacroix (1994) and Poapongsakorn et al. (2000) have developed measures of the MCF from increased tax enforcement activity. A natural extension of the MCF concept is to calculate the marginal social cost of funds obtained by public sector borrowing. However, to my knowledge, there are no other studies that have developed a measure of the MCF for debt financing. This is an important gap in the literature because the MCF for debt financing can be interpreted as the "hurdle benefit-cost ratio" that a debt-financed public project needs in order to generate a net social gain. Thus, the MCF for debt financing has important applications in the cost-benefit analysis of debt-financed projects. The objective of this paper is to start to fill this important gap in the public finance literature by developing a measure of the MCF for public sector borrowing.
The public debt can impose a burden in a closed economy through two mechanisms. The first mechanism is the wealth effect that is highlighted in Modigliani (1961) and Diamond (1965) because savers substitute public debt for real capital in their portfolios. This wealth effect vanishes if individuals have long time horizons and care about the well-being of future generations, generating the Ricardian property. The second mechanism, which has received much less attention, arises from the distortionary effects of the taxes that have to be levied to finance the interest payments on the public debt. The higher tax needed to finance a higher level of debt may reduce the incentive to save and invest, thereby lowering the long-term growth rate of the economy. In this paper, a simple AK endogenous growth model is used to explore the connections between the public debt, distortionary taxation, and the rate of economic growth and to develop a measure of the MCF for public sector borrowing. It is a model of a closed economy, where the net savings rate (the difference between the private sector savings rate and the public sector's deficit ratio) is equal to the investment rate. Even though individuals' saving behaviour has the Ricardian equivalence property in this model, the net saving rate declines with an increase in the public debt because of the increase in the tax rate that is required to finance the higher interest payments on public debt. This distortionary tax effect causes the investment rate, and hence the rate of economic growth, to decline.
In Section 3, this relatively simple framework is used to derive a formula for the MCF for public sector borrowing that depends on individuals' preference parameters-the rate of time preference, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption goods-the public sector's fiscal position-its debt ratio, its program expenditure ratio, and its tax rate-as well as the pre-tax rate of return on investment, the only production parameter in the model. This measure of the MCF for public sector borrowing has two components. One component measures the responsiveness of the present value of the government's net revenue stream (PVNR) to changes in the tax rate. The greater the distortionary effect of a tax increase, the less responsive the PVNR is to a tax rate increase because of shrinkage of the tax base, and the higher the MCF from public sector borrowing. As is well known, the magnitude of the MCF depends on the shape of the underlying Laffer curve for tax revenues. For example, if a government is operating near the peak of its Laffer curve, then the MCF will be very high because a tax rate increase generates relatively little additional tax revenue. In this model, the PVNR Laffer curve always has a positive slope, and the slope is increasing in the tax rate if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one. This effect arises because the net rate of return on government debt that is used to compute the PVNR declines by more than the reduction in the economic growth rate when the tax rate increases, leading to an increase in the present value of the government's tax base. Thus, the model yields some interesting insights into the nature of the government's intertemporal budget constraint, as well as providing a measure of the MCF for debt financing.
The other component of the MCF measures the present value of the reduction in private and publicly-provided goods and services due to changes in the growth rate caused by a tax rate increase. One of the key insights from this derivation of the MCF is the importance of including the value of the foregone consumption of the public good in calculating the MCF. Our calculations show that this is likely to be a very important component of the MCF from debt financing and that the MCF will be significantly underestimated if it is ignored.
In Section 4, we derive the condition for the optimal program expenditure ratio for a consumptive public good. The optimality condition has the same form as the Atkinson-Stern condition for a public good that does not affect the revenues generated by the public sector. While some commentators have suggested that fiscal adjustments in countries with higher debt ratio takes the form of lower program spending rather than higher taxes, we show that the optimal program spending ratio is independent of the debt ratio if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one, and we explain why the numerical simulations of the model indicate that the optimal program spending ratio is (slightly) increasing in the debt ratio. Thus, the model predicts that the fiscal adjustment to an increase in the debt ratio is on the tax side of the budget.
In general, as Triest (1990) and Hakonsen (1998) have shown, the formula for the MCF depends on the set of prices that are used to measure welfare changes. This also applies to the MCF for debt financing. The main formula for the MCF that is derived in Section 3 is based on the assumption that the government discounts tax revenues and program costs using the after-tax interest rate. This is a convenient way of defining the MCF because the private sector also discounts future benefits using the after-tax interest rate.
1 However, we show that if future tax revenues and program expenditures are discounted using the pretax interest rate, then the MCF will be higher, but the optimal program expenditure will remain the same, because the marginal cost of increasing the program expenditure ratio will be lower. Thus, this paper also makes a (modest) contribution to the voluminous literature on the discount rate that should be used in cost-benefit analysis.
In Section 5, we calculate the MCFs using parameter values that allow the model to replicate the average growth rates and the public and private consumption ratios for the Canadian and U.S. economies in the 1990s. For Canada, the MCF is about 1.20, and the model predicts that eliminating the public debt ratio would only increase the Canadian growth rate by a tenth of a percentage point. For the U.S., the MCF is only 1.085 because the level of the public debt and program expenditures are lower and because the elasticity of substitution is lower in the benchmark U.S. calculations. When the models are calibrated with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.75 for both Canada and the U.S., the MCF is 1.455 for Canada and 1.355 for the U.S. The final section of the paper discusses the limitations of the model and directions for future research.
A Model of the Effect of the Public Debt on Economic Growth
Total output at time t is equal to:
where K t is the accumulated factor of production (physical and human capital) and A is the constant rate of return on this input. We will restrict our attention to the balanced growth path for this economy, where total output is growing at a constant rate γ. The capital stock is also growing at the constant rate γ because it is assumed that there is no technological change and no depreciation. This implies that the annual rate of net investment is I t = γK t . Substituting back into (1), we obtain:
where i = I/Y is the investment rate. In other words, the growth rate is proportional to the investment rate in the economy. This simple relationship between the growth rate of the economy and the investment rate is the key feature of this simple endogenous growth model, and there is considerable empirical evidence indicating that countries with higher investments rates also have higher growth rates. The population is normalized to equal one, so all of the stocks and flows can be interpreted as per capita variables. Individuals are identical and are represented by a single individual whose utility at time t is:
where C t is private consumption, G t is consumption of a publicly-provided good which we will refer to as the government's program spending, σ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and β > 0 is a parameter that reflects the relative valuation of private and public consumption goods. The representative individual takes as given the level of the public good, and the tax rate, τ. Each period, the individual chooses his level of consumption and allocates his savings between investment in new capital, K t , and purchases of government bonds, B t . The individual's budget constraint in each time period is:
where t K
• and
• t B are the rates of change in capital and government bonds. The right-hand side of (4) shows the individual's current after-tax income from production and interest payments on government bonds. This is a closed economy, and there is no external debt, i.e. the individuals owe the public debt to themselves. The representative individual discounts future utility at the rate ρ > 0 and makes consumption-savings decisions to maximize welfare V where:
To simplify the notation, we will omit the time subscript unless it is necessary for the interpretation of an equation.
With the optimal consumption plan, private consumption grows at the rate, γ, where:
An increase in the tax rate will slow the growth rate of consumption because it reduces the net rate of return on savings. The reduction in the growth rate caused by an increase in the tax rate, ∂γ/∂τ = -σA, is proportional to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, the key behaviour parameter in the model.
The growth of the public debt is equal to the public sector's budget deficit, which is given by the right-hand side of (7):
Along the balanced growth path of the economy, C, B, K, G, and Y all grow at the rate γ, and the public sector's debt ratio, b = B/Y, its program expenditure ratio, g = G/Y, and the tax rate, τ, remain constant. Therefore the deficit ratio is equal to γb where:
This intertemporal budget constraint can also be written as:
The government's primary surplus ratio, which is the left-hand side of (9) assuming for simplicity that interest on the government's debt is not taxed, has to equal the equilibrium debt ratio multiplied by θ, the difference between the after-tax rate of return on capital and the growth rate of the economy, if the debt ratio is to remain constant.
The government's intertemporal budget constraint does not depend on whether interest payments on government debt are taxed. If interest on the public debt is not taxed, the interest rate on government bonds would be equal to the after-tax return on capital, (1 -τ)A. If interest on the public debt is taxed, the interest rate on the public debt is pre-tax return on capital, and the right-hand side of the (9) would be (A -γ)b. However, the left-hand side would be equal to τ(1 + Ab) -g, and therefore the government's intertemporal budget constraint would be the same as in the case where interest on the public debt is not taxed. It will be convenient to assume that interest on the public debt is not taxed because this implies that the public sector and the private sector will discount future income streams using the same discount rate. Thus the present values of tax revenues and program expenditures are based on the after-tax rate of interest, (1 -τ)A, and not the pre-tax rate of return on capital. In Section 4, we consider the MCF when the government uses the pre-tax rate of return on capital to discount future revenue streams and costs.
Using the expression for the equilibrium growth rate of the economy in (6), θ is equal to:
A condition for dynamic stability is that θ > 0, or in other words, that the after-tax rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy. Since τ [ 1, this condition will be satisfied if σ [ 1, which is the relevant range of values for σ based on econometric studies of savings behaviour. Note that Øθ/Ø < 0 if σ < 1, which implies that, holding the debt ratio constant, the primary surplus that the government has to run in order to have a sustainable fiscal policy decreases as the tax rate increases. As we will see, this effect tends to ease the government's fiscal burden when its debt increases, thereby helping to moderate the MCF from public sector borrowing.
To derive the consumption ratio along the balanced growth path, we divide both sides of (4) by K.
in (11), and noting that B/K is equal to Ab, we obtain:
The model predicts that an increase in debt ratio, holding the tax rate constant, will increase the consumption rate and that an increase in the tax rate, holding the debt ratio constant, will reduce the consumption rate if σ < 1 because Øθ/Ø < 0.
As (2) indicated, the growth rate of the economy is proportional to the investment rate, which in this closed economy is equal to the net savings ratethe difference between the private sector savings rate and the public sector's deficit ratio. Therefore i = s -γb, where s represents the private sector's savings ratio, S/Y. Given g, b, A, ρ, and σ, the model yields the following closed-form solutions for the key endogenous variables:
and i = s -γb.
Below, we will try to provide an intuitive explanation of the effect of an increase in the debt ratio on the growth rate of the economy. First, note that an increase in the debt ratio, holding the expenditure rate constant, leads to an increase in the tax rate, assuming that the condition for dynamic stability is satisfied:
The effect of an increase in the debt ratio on the private sector savings rate can be decomposed as follows:
The first term on the right-hand side of (18) is the Ricardian equivalence effect. An increase in b will increase the deficit ratio, γb, and this prompts an individual to increase his savings rate to offset the decline in the public sector savings rate. This forward-looking response arises from our assumption that the economy is composed of infinitely-lived individuals. The second term on the right-hand side of (18) is the distortionary tax effect which arises because of the higher tax rate that is required to finance additional debt reduces the net rate of return on saving. These effects push the private sector savings rate in opposite directions, and therefore an increase in the debt ratio has an ambiguous effect on the private sector savings rate.
The overall effect of an increase in b on the growth rate depends on its effect on the investment rate, which in turn depends on the change in the net savings rate s -γb, as shown below:
The first term in square brackets is the effect of an increase in b on the private sector savings rate, and the second term is the effect on the deficit ratio.
Substituting (18) into (19) yields:
An increase in b causes γ to decline, even though an increase in b has an ambiguous effect on the private sector savings rate, because the Ricardian equivalence effect from the private sector savings response exactly offsets the increase in the deficit ratio. Therefore, the total net savings rate declines by the distortionary tax effect, leading to declines in the investment rate and the equilibrium growth rate. In Section 5, the model is used to calculate the impact on the growth rate of an increase on the public debt, based on parameter values that allow the model to replicate γ and c for the Canadian and U.S. economies in the 1990s.
The Marginal Cost of Funds from Public Sector Borrowing
We begin by deriving an expression for the equilibrium level of welfare in the economy. Along the balanced growth path, C t = zK 0 e γt and G t = gAK 0 e γt where K 0 is the economy's capital stock at time 0 and z = θ(1 +Ab). Substituting these values into (3) and (5), the discounted value of the representative individual's utility stream is: 
AK
, calculated at the "implicit" discount rate, θ, which is the same implicit discount rate used to calculate the present value of the government's tax revenues and program expenditures. Welfare also depends on τ because θ and c are functions of the tax rate. In other words, the implicit discount rate used to calculate the representative individual's welfare level depends on the rate of taxation because it reduces the after-tax rate of return on savings and because it lowers the rate of economic growth.
For future reference, the marginal benefit from an increase in the program expenditure ratio, MB g will be defined as:
where λ 0 = (cAK 0 ) -1/σ is the marginal utility of consumption at time 0. MB g is a money measure of the gain from a permanent increase in the proportion of output devoted to public program expenditures, measured at the initial marginal utility of income.
The marginal cost of public funds is the cost to a society in raising an additional dollar of tax revenue. A tax rate increase usually induces tax avoidance and evasion behaviour that causes the government's tax base to shrink. The shrinkage of the tax base is a reflection of the loss of economic efficiency caused by the distortion in the allocation of resources in the economy, and the marginal cost of funds is usually greater than one.
3 In static models, the MCF is usually defined as (-1/λ)(dV/dτ)/(dR/d ) where R is tax revenue. However, Liu (2002) has shown that when the cost of government programs is affected by the tax rate, it is more appropriate to define the MCF as (-1/λ)(dV/dτ)/(dNR/dτ) where dNR/dτ is the rate of change in the government's net revenues, i.e. the difference between its tax revenues and program expenditures. In a dynamic model, the definition of the MCF should be based on the rate of change in the present value of the government's net revenue stream.
The present value of the government's net revenue stream is equal to:
An increase in the tax rate has two offsetting effects on the present value of the tax/expenditure base, AK/θ. On the one hand, an increase in the tax rate reduces the growth rate of the economy, which lowers the present value of the tax/expenditure base. On the other hand, a higher tax rate lowers the after-tax rate of return on government debt, which increases the present value of the tax/expenditure base. Taking the partial derivative of PVNR in (23) with respect to τ, we obtain:
since τ -g = θb along the balanced growth path and
. Consequently, the government's PVNR Laffer curve has a positive slope for < 1 + (Ab) -1 , which is the empirically relevant case. Therefore, it is not possible to increase the present value of the government's net revenues by lowering the tax rate Figure 1 The PVNR Laffer Curve for σ < 1
The marginal cost of public funds for a tax rate increase is defined as follows:
As with all expressions for the MCF, the numerator is a money measure of the loss sustained by the private sector, and the denominator is the increase in government revenues, from a small tax rate increase. In the current context, the numerator is the present value of the current and future welfare losses sustained by the representative agent and the denominator is the present value of the increase in the government's net revenue stream. The resulting ratio is the loss sustained by the private sector from increasing the government's primary surplus by one dollar in present value terms. This is the most appropriate way of defining the MCF in the context of a dynamic model and, as will be shown below, for defining the MCF from an increase in the public sector debt ratio. 
Taking the derivative of V in (21) with respect to τ, the following expression for the social cost of a tax increase can be obtained:
Combining (24) and (26), the following formula for the MCF can be obtained: This formula indicates that the MCF has two components. The component in round brackets is the inverse of the elasticity of the PVNR with respect to (τ -g). The greater the distortionary effect of a tax increase, the lower the elasticity of the PVNR, and the higher the MCF for debt financing. This component of the MCF will be higher the greater the debt-to-capital ratio and the greater the intertemporal elasticity of the substitution.
The other component in square brackets is the social loss caused by the reduction in private and public service consumption. In particular, public program expenditures are assumed to be a constant proportion of output, and therefore a slower rate of economic growth, caused by a tax rate increase, means the level of public services is lower than it otherwise would be. This loss depends on the strength of the preference for the public services, β, and the (c/g) ratio.
One of the key insights from this derivation of the MCF is the importance of accounting for the value of the foregone public consumption in calculating the MCF for a tax increase. As we will see in Section 5, incorporating this component of the welfare loss from taxation has an important impact on the measured MCF.
Note also that the MCF approaches 1.00 as σ approaches 0, and the tax becomes non-distortionary. For 0 < σ [ 1, the MCF is greater than one, but is decreasing in τ. Normally, we expect the MCF to be increasing in the tax rate because the deadweight loss from tax distortions increases with the square of the tax rate. One way of explaining this anomalous feature of the MCF in this model is that the slope of the PVNR Laffer curve is increasing in the tax rate for 0 < σ < 1, and therefore marginal tax revenue (in present value terms) is increasing as the tax rate increases, thereby lowering the cost of raising additional revenues. Finally, note that the MCF is increasing in b, holding the (c/g) ratio constant.
We have derived this expression for the MCF for a tax rate increase, but it can also be interpreted as the marginal cost of public funds from public sector borrowing as is shown below: Intuitively, the MCF b is the same as MCF τ because, if the government borrows an extra dollar, the present value of its net revenue stream must also increase by one dollar. In the remainder of this paper, we will simply refer to this common value as the MCF.
The Effect of the Public Debt on Optimal Public Expenditures
To this point, it has been assumed that the government's program expenditure ratio, g, remains constant when the debt ratio increases and that all of the fiscal adjustment to an increase in the debt occurs on the tax side of the budget. However, some observers feel that an increase in interest payments on the public debt crowds out program spending. In the following section, the condition determining the optimal level of program spending is derived in order to analyze the effects of an increase in the public debt on the program expenditure ratio.
To determine the government's optimal tax and expenditure program (holding the government's debt ratio constant), we maximize (21) with respect to τ and g subject to the government's intertemporal budget constraint in (9). The Lagrangian for this problem is
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the government's intertemporal budget constraint. The first-order conditions for this problem are:
Using (22), (24), and (26), the condition for optimal program expenditures has the form:
where MC g = (AK 0 )/θ is the marginal cost of an increase in the program expenditure ratio and the value of c is determined by (16). Equation (31) is the equivalent of the static Atkinson-Stern condition for optimal public expenditures financed by distortionary taxation for a public good that does not affect tax revenues.
The optimal (g, τ) combination satisfies (17) and (31). It is not possible to obtain a general closed-form solution for τ and g, but some insights can be gained from examining the solution for σ = 1:
The reason why the optimal program expenditure ratio is independent of the public debt ratio when σ = 1 is shown in Figure 2 . For a given level of the public debt b 0 , the MCF is (1 + β)(1 + Ab 0 ) and therefore independent of the program expenditure ratio and the tax rate, while the ratio MB g /MC g is decreasing in g and independent of the tax rate. The optimal public expenditure ratio is g 0 when the debt level is b 0 . An increase in the debt ratio, increases both the MCF and the MB g /MC g ratio in the same proportion, and therefore it has no effect on the optimal level of g. Thus, the key reason why the optimal g is independent of b is
Figure 2
The Optimal Program Spending Ratio when σ =1 that a higher debt ratio raises the marginal benefit from g in the same proportion as it increases the MCF. This effect arises with the preferences specified in (3) because private consumption and public consumption are complementary, and a higher debt ratio leads to a higher consumption ratio.
I have not been able to sign dg/db when for 0 < σ < 1. However, calculations using with a wide range of parameter values indicate that the optimal g is (slightly) increasing in b when σ < 1. (The calculations in the next section will illustrate this effect.) In Figure 3 , I try to explain why the optimal g is increasing in b for σ < 1. The optimal (g, τ) combination is the solution to equation (31), which we will label the optimization condition (OC), and equation (9), which is the government's intertemporal budget constraint (BC). In the absence of the public debt, BC is a 45 degree line from the origin. OC has a negative slope in (g, τ) for 0 < σ < 1.
5 Initially, there is no public debt, and the optimal expenditure ratio and tax rate are g 0 and τ 0 . An increase in the public debt to b 1 > 0, shifts the intercept of BC to τ L and the maximum program expenditure ratio that can be financed is g u . The slope of BC, which is equal to [1 + (1 -σ)Ab] -1 , declines when the public debt increases because the tax rate increase needed to finance an increase in g causes the after-tax interest rate to The Optimal Program Spending Ratio and Tax Rate for 0 < σ <1 decrease, thereby reducing the tax revenue needed to finance the public debt when 1 < < 1. Therefore, the required ∆τ is less than ∆g. An increase in the public debt also causes OC to shifts up because an increase in b increases the MB g /MC g ratio (through its effect on c) more than the MCF. To restore equality, holding τ constant, g must increase because an increase in g reduces the MB g /MC g ratio proportionately more than it reduces the MCF. The upward shift in OC and the reduction in the slope of BC offset the upward shift in the BC, and the optimal g remains virtually constant. Therefore almost all of the adjustment to the higher debt ratio occurs on the tax side of the budget.
While the model predicts that public debt does not crowd out spending on government services as a proportion of GDP, it can be shown that an increase in the public debt will crowd out program spending in the sense that the (c/g) ratio is increasing in b if σ [ 1. In other words, the model predicts that a higher public debt will reduce public service consumption relative to private consumption.
As was noted in Section 2, the government's intertemporal budget constraint is the same whether or not interest on the public debt is taxed, and therefore the optimal level of public expenditure is independent of whether interest on the public debt is taxed. It has been convenient to assume that interest on the public debt is not taxed, in deriving the formula for the MCF and the optimal program expenditure rate, because in this case both the private and public sectors use the after-tax rate of return to discount future benefits, tax revenue, and costs. If the interest on the public debt is taxed and the government uses the pretax interest rate to discount future tax revenues and costs, the marginal cost of funds formula would be amended to equal MCF′ = ((A -γ)/θ)⋅MCF. Since (A -γ)/θ > 1, the MCF′ > MCF. However, the definition of the marginal cost of increasing the program expenditure ratio would also change if the government uses the pre-tax rate of return to discount future costs, and it would equal MC g ′ h AK 0 /(A -γ) < MC g h AK 0 /θ. Therefore, MCF′⋅ MC g ′ = MCF⋅MC g and the optimal g is independent of whether the interest payments on the public debt are taxed or not, and whether the government uses the pre-tax or the post-tax rate of return to calculate the present value of future tax revenues and costs. Note, however, that the MB g would be calculated using the after-tax rate of return that the private sector receives on savings in either case. Table 1 shows the calculation of the marginal cost of public funds using parameter values that replicate the average values of the key variables for the Canadian economy in the 1990s. In particular, for Canada in the 1990s, γ = 0.016, b = 0.728, c = 0.589, and g = 0.213.
Calculations

6
Given these values, A = γ/(1 -c -g) = 0.081. That leaves the preference parameters-ρ, σ, and β-to be determined. In the base case scenario, we have used a conventional value for the personal rate of time preference, ρ = 0.02. We then computed the values of σ = 0.391 and β = 0.088 that generate values of c = 0.589 and g = 0.213 using equations (16) and (31). All of these parameter values are plausible. (One of the attractive features of this simple model is that it can replicate key features of the Canadian economy in the 1990s with a few "reasonable" parameter values.)
With these base case parameters, the MCF is 1.195. In other words, the "hurdle benefit-cost ratio" that a debt-financed public project needs in order to generate a net social gain is about 1.2. Alternatively, these calculations indicate that reducing the public debt by $1.00 has a long-term payoff, through lower taxes and a slightly higher economic growth rate, of $1.20.
As noted above, one of the most important features of our derivation of the formula for the MCF was showing that its value depends on the strength of the preference for the public good. If the private sector did not value the public good and β = 0, then the MCF = (1 + Ab)/[1 + (1 -σ)Ab] = 1.022. This shows that the MCF would be significantly underestimated if we ignored the social loss that Table 1 Calculations MCF calculated using the after-tax rate of return on government bonds to discount net revenues and costs. b MCF′ calculated using the pre-tax rate of return on government bonds to discount net revenues and costs.
arises from the reduction in public good consumption as a result of a slower rate of economic growth. Finally, the table shows that MCF′, the marginal cost of public funds when tax revenues and program costs are discounted using the pretax rate of return, is significantly higher than the MCF value based on the aftertax rate of return. We want to stress, however, that either value of the MCF can be used as long as MC g is defined in a consistent manner. Table 1 also shows how the growth rate, the MCF, and the optimal program expenditure ratio vary with the public debt ratio. If the public debt were eliminated, the model predicts that the growth rate of the Canadian economy would increase by a tenth of a percentage point. If the debt ratio doubled to 1.456, the growth rate of the economy would decline by a tenth of a percentage point. The public debt has a relatively modest impact on the growth rate in this model because, as noted earlier, the Ricardian equivalence effect offsets the increase in the deficit ratio and therefore the reduction in the net savings rate is very small.
The MCF would decline only modestly from 1.195 to 1.166 if the public debt was eliminated, and it would increase to 1.221 if the public debt ratio doubled. The reason why the MCF is so unresponsive to the debt ratio is that the tax rate only falls by 3.5 percentage points with the elimination of the public debt, and therefore a fairly large distortionary tax remains even if the debt is eliminated. Thus, the social cost of the first dollar of public debt is almost as high as an additional dollar of debt when the debt ratio is over 100 percent. Finally, the model predicts that the optimal program expenditure ratio would decrease very slightly to 0.211 if the public debt was eliminated. Doubling the public debt would increase the optimal program expenditure ratio slightly to 0.215. Thus, the calculations confirms the analysis in Figure 3 , which showed that an increase in the public debt can increase the optimal program expenditure ratio if 0 < σ < 1.
These calculations were based on the parameter values ρ = 0.02 and σ = 0.391. While it is common to use a value of 0.02 for in simulations of endogenous growth models, the value for σ is lower than the value used in other models. For example, in the four endogenous growth models surveyed by McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) , the authors used elasticities of substitution between 0.5 and 1.0. In order to see how sensitive the predictions of this model are to the value of σ, we performed a second set of calculations using σ = 0.75. We then computed the values of ρ = 0.0396 and β = 0.375 that generate values of c = 0.589 and g = 0.213. With the higher values for ρ, σ, and β, the two alternative measures of the marginal cost of public funds are higher-MCF = 1.455 and the MCF′ = 1.616-which is not surprising because this makes the growth rate more sensitive to increases in the tax rate, and the social loss from reduced program expenditures is also higher. These calculations indicate that the MCF is somewhat sensitive to the assumed value of the elasticity of substitution and the implied values of the other parameters. Table 2 shows the same set of calculations using parameter values that replicate the average values of key variables for the U.S. economy in the 1990s, with γ = 0. 021, b = 0.47, c = 0.668, and g = 0.190. 7 Given these values for the U.S., A = γ/(1 -c -g) = 0.148. Assuming ρ = 0.02, values of σ = 0.225 and β = 0.00405 were calculated using equations (16) and (31). The results using these U.S. parameter values are qualitatively similar to the calculations using Canadian parameters, but the MCFs are significantly lower because the value for that is used in these calculations is substantially lower. When a value of = 0.75 is adopted (along with the implied values = 0.085 and = 0.253), the MCF for the U.S. economy is 1.355 for b = 0.47, and the economic growth rate is much more sensitive to the level of the public debt.
The theoretical model and the calculations suggest that the optimal g and (c/g) ratios will be relatively insensitive to variations in the debt ratio. To my knowledge, there are no empirical studies of the extent to which public debt crowds out government spending on goods and services. Some evidence concerning the impact of public debt on the size of the public sector are contained in Figures 4 and 5 , which plots the average ratio of consumptive government spending to GDP and the average ratio of public to private consumption spending to the average debt ratio for 22 industrialized countries over the period 1990-98. In either case, a country's debt ratio does not have a statistically significant effect on its g or g/c, results that are broadly consistent with the prediction of this model. This is of course only a very superficial analysis, and a more detailed empirically analysis is required to test the hypotheses regarding the effect of debt on government spending. Table 2 Calculations a MCF calculated using the after-tax rate of return on government bonds to discount net revenues and costs. b MCF′ calculated using the pre-tax rate of return on government bonds to discount net revenues and costs. 
Conclusion
In this paper, a simple AK endogenous growth model has been used to illustrate the inter-relationships between the public debt, distortionary taxation, and the rate of economic growth. The higher tax rate that is required to finance the interest payments on a higher public debt reduces the growth rate of the economy by lowering the net savings and the investment rate. Although the predicted reduction in the growth rate appears to be quite modest-doubling the debt ratio only reduces the growth rate by about a tenth of a percentage point-it represents a significant social loss because of the cumulative loss of public and private consumption. Calculations indicate that the marginal cost of funds from public sector borrowing is around 1.20 for the base case parameter values that replicate the key variables for the Canadian economy and around 1.09 for the parameter values that replicate the U.S. economy, in the 1990s. The MCFs for Canada and the U.S. are 1.45 and 1.35 if we use an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.75, a value that is comparable to those used in simulating other endogenous growth models. The model predicts that the optimal program expenditure ratio will be relatively insensitive to variations in the debt ratio, and therefore most of the fiscal adjustment to an increase in the public debt will be on the tax side of the budget. Some very simple cross-country comparisons of debt and consumptive program expenditure ratios are consistent with this prediction.
The model has the merit of providing a simple, intuitive framework for analyzing the impact of the public debt on the rate of economic growth. It allows us to obtain closed-form solutions for the key endogenous variables, such as the growth rate, and a formula for the MCF, so that we do not have to rely on the "black box" simulations that are necessary for more complex endogenous growth models. However, the simplicity of the model also imposes a number of limitations. One of the most important limitations is that the model only incorporates the aggregate tax rate, and it treats all taxes as if they taxed the return to financial and human capital. In practice, the tax mix may be more important than the level of taxation in determining the rate of economic growth, with taxes on the return to savings having a bigger impact on the growth rate than consumption taxes. It clearly would be very useful to incorporate a wider range of tax instruments in the model. It should be noted, however, that even if payroll and consumption taxes do not affect the rate of economic growth, they could affect the level of economic activity insofar as they reduce people's incentive to supply labour. These "level effects" are also a burden of the public debt. It would be very useful to extend the model to include a wider range of tax instruments and to include both the growth and the level effects of higher taxes in the measuring the burden of the public debt. Second, the model represents a closed economy, and there is no foreignheld debt. Many countries borrow abroad, either directly or indirectly, in order to finance a public sector deficit. A higher public debt can impose a burden on the economy either by increasing the interest rate that foreigners require in order to finance the debt or by putting downward pressure on the exchange rate. Van der Ploeg (1996) and Turnovsky (1997) have developed open economy endogenous growth models with foreign borrowing. In these models, a higher level of foreign indebtedness increases the interest rate charged by foreign lenders which reduces investment and the rate of economic growth. Thus, the predicted effects of an increase in debt are similar, in qualitative terms, in open and closed endogenous growth models, but it would be interesting to have an analysis of the relative costs of public debt in open and closed economies. I have attempted to extend the model to an open economy where there is an endogenous risk premium on foreign debt that arises from the potential for debt repudiation. Preliminary analysis of this model indicated that repudiation was almost always in the interest of an indebted country, even if it meant that it would not be able to engage in foreign borrowing in the future. The linearity of the model and the failure to include other transactions costs, such as a reduction in a country's ability to export and import goods if it repudiates its debt, may explain this feature of the model. The recent econometric study by Engen and Hubbard (2004) found that an increase in the federal-debt-to-GDP ratio of one percentage point increased the interest rate on U.S. federal debt by only two to three basis points. This implies that one of the key features of our model-that the pre-tax rate of return on capital is constant-may be a reasonable assumption in modeling the effects of an increase in the public debt.
A third limitation of the model is that it assumes that private sector savings behaviour is based on identical, forward-looking, infinitely-lived individuals, and this gives rise to the Ricardian equivalence effect. While I have reservations about the empirical importance of the Ricardian equivalence, I have adopted it in this model for two reasons. First, it greatly simplifies the modeling of savings behaviour and aggregate social welfare. Second, as Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) note, Ricardian equivalence provides a useful benchmark, or a "natural starting point," in constructing a model of government debt. In this regard, our model shows how a single departure from the conditions for strict Ricardian equivalence-in this case the use of distortionary taxes-affects the burden of the public debt. Our model suggests that distortionary taxes do not push the growth rate very far from its equilibrium value under strict Ricardian equivalence, although they have a significant effect on the MCF from debt financing.
Analyzing the MCF from public sector borrowing in models that do not display Ricardian equivalence behaviour is also of interest. 8 In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations model, the wealth effect caused by an increase in the public debt can produce a large crowding out effect, resulting in a high MCF from public sector borrowing if we include the present value of the losses sustained by future generations. The Diamond model also indicates that a deficit can improve the well-being of the workers who are alive at the time the debt is incurred. Consequently, in the absence of a default risk, a government has a strong incentive to increase the public debt because the costs are incurred by future generations who, of course, cannot vote and have no influence on the decision. If the "real world" were like this, the public debt would be quickly pushed to the maximum sustainable level. While the governments of most developed countries have significant debt levels, it is difficult to argue that they have been pushed to unsustainable levels (except perhaps in some European countries if one counts unfunded public pension liabilities as part of the public debt). Other institutional factors, such as capital market distortions caused by asymmetric information, may also affect the MCF from public sector borrowing and should be investigated in future research.
